An Empirical Study Of The Performance Of Listing Companies Whose Controlling Stockholders Have Changed

The company domination is the core question of the theory of company governs and practices. In these years, there are more and more empirical research papers in the theory of the company governs. But not many papers focus on the changes of the controlling stockholder. It is more and more important for a listing company to change controlling stockholder efficiency. This paper is a empirical study of the changes of the controlling stockholders on the performance. This paper tries to find out the best mode of the alternation of the controlling stockholder through the positive research.This paper combine the standardization analysis and the empirical study, this paper selects alternation of the controlling stockholder events of china-listed company in happened in 2002 and 2003. and analyzes their impacts on corporate financial performance through factor analysis. It makes comparison of the inclination of the listed company's purpose before and after alternation of the controlling stockholder(year 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004) and get some conclusion. The events are classified into several groups according to through dividing into groups, our study leads to the follow conclusions: At first we found that those alternations of the controlling stockholder events completed by contracts play positive roles, but the alternation of the controlling stockholder events not completed by contracts play negative roles. The second conclusion is that the performance of these events happened in 2003 play better than that happened in 2002. The third conclusion is that the new the behavior of the companies controlled by private companies are performance better than that not controlled by private companies after the alternation. Our study mainly focus on to which extent the government influences the alternation of the controlling stockholder purpose of the listed company and analyzes the executives' behavior during the alternation of the controlling stockholder of the listed company. And addition to this, our study explains the reason why the private companies have successfully controlled the companies altered. Based on the theory of market-orientation.