Research On Government Credit In Regulatory Industry

Research on the regulatory theory abroad mainly focuses on the regulatory incentive rather than on the structure of regulatory governance. So does domestic economics. Due to this research trend, the reform of the regulator industry in china is obviously marked with "European or American Model", but the final performance of the reform differs from that of "European or American Model". This phenomenon leads to the rethinking of the application in china of mainstream regulatory theory. Based on the above, the paper holds that when doing research on the reform of the regulatory industry in transitional country, it will provide new insight into the regulatory theory, if from the perspective of government credit, combined with national institutional backgroundindustry in transitional country such as china, it will be more helpful for us to understand the reform if we do it from the perspective of national specific institutional background, especially from the perspective of the influence of the government administration, legislation and judicatory on the reform performance. The fourth chapter briefly lists the phenomenon of the government credit anomie during the process of the telecommunication reform, and then explains these phenomenon with the application of the cost-benefit theory, property rights theory and principal-agent theory of institutional economics, in order to prove the theme of this paper, which is it will provide new and effective insights into the reform of the Chinese telecommunication if we pay more attention to the structure of the regulatory governance, if we study the reform from the perspective of the government credit. In the fifth chapter, with the framework of the game theory, the paper is intended to build up the government credit protection mechanism by the means of demonstrating why we appeal for faithful government, and how to motivate and constraint government to be faithful.