Studies On Venture Capital Contracts

After the venture capital market appeared in the U.S.A. for about half century, the ability to improve the development of High-Tech has been recognized. Just like one coin has its two sides, as an innovative financial means, venture capital shows its special characteristic which makes it distinguish from traditional finance. One of the most outstanding characteristic is the agency venture of organization inside caused by asymmetric information. The starting point of research is how to avert moral hazard and adverse selection to decrease agent cost.All these information asymmetries will cause serious moral hazard. Compared with those countries with mature investment market, a practical and measurable "running process" and evaluation system haven't been set up. So, many institutional factors restrain the improvement of Chinese venture capital market. But the main reason is not totally what have been mentioned above but incomplete contracts.All in all, My dissertation mainly focuses on phenomena existing in Chinese venture capital investment market with double principle-agent theory. According to actual conditions, we think that shareholders who are full of wishes to supervise the daily management of the venture capital should be nurtured. Another, the evaluation system with government as cautioner, the incentive and restrictive mechanism implemented and anonymous assess as trait in the beginning of process should be improved uninterrupted. Last but not least, in the choosing of exit ways of the venture capital, the MBO method is one that couldn't be ignored.As a kind of non-traditional, new-type melting and investment way, venture capital is impelling organic integration of fund, technology, management and venture spirit, which is the basis for the developing high-tech modern enterprise model.