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Research On Contract Mechanism And Relative Interaction In Venture Capital

Posted on:2008-07-14Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y X QiuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189360245487215Subject:Finance
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
From the view of contract theory in this paper, three participators in venture capital—investor, venture capitalist and venture entrepreneur—they not only cooperate and stimulate mutually but also have common benefit or private beneficial conflicts, which compose principal-agent relation under the condition of asymmetric information .The first agent relation arises between investor and venture capitalist, the second agent relation happens between venture capitalist and venture entrepreneur. Basing on the appearance of double-side principal-agent and exit contract selective problems, the venture capital contract problems have become the hot issues in the research field recently.The aim of this thesis is to resolve the above problem by constructing contract mechanism, studying respectively the behavior of investor, venture entrepreneur and venture capitalist and the relationship of their mutual restraint and influences under the condition of asymmetric information. Meanwhile, the paper compared the mechanism of exit stage. Especially, this paper analyze mainly the problem of contract relation between the participators under the situation of asymmetry information and multistage investment, designing a reasonable mechanism as far as possible to reduce risk and agent cost. Because the action of participator is observable in repeating game, we can judge the executive ability and credit situation in the whole investment process to restrain the agent behavior in investment, to prompt the venture capital regularly running and improve the success rate of venture capital. This article has used multistage investment analysis method, pushing forward the studying depth, making the model more flexible and practical and breaking through the past static research method, applying dynamic way reconsider some problems, all of which are no doubt a new kind of angle of view, by analyzing we will work out a set of resolving methods which are more close to experience.Under our country's venture capital macroscopical environment, the article brought forward a few methods to problems on present stage exist in venture capital. Final part summed up the whole essay and point out existing defects because of objective factors and the problem to be further resolved.
Keywords/Search Tags:venture capital, contract mechanism, asymmetric information
PDF Full Text Request
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