The Study On The Moral Hazard In Chinese Social Insurance System

The moral hazard can exist in any domain, in the social security domain, the old-age insurance, the medical insurance and the unemployment insurance with the public goods nature, appears the moral hazard the probability to be able higher, the harm can be bigger. In present, the moral hazard is a bad conduct behavior, the behavior always act because of choice among the national, the enterprise and individual tripartite. As individual, Can appear massively the cheating to guarantee the behavior, the enterprise can appear the reversion choice and the enterprise runs away the expense, the government will be able to attempt to bear passes the burden for the enterprise, at the same time, the national agent's of social security department's superintendents diverts the insurance fund the risk.The influence morals hazard factor are very many, this article relates through the social security system in three levels of requests — proxy, analyzes between three main bodies to depend on for existence mutually specifically with the relations which gambles mutually .Through to entrusts the elaboration which the agent relates, we draw the conclusion: One is the government is throughout stems from entrusts the core status which the agent relates, no matter is the abstract government, under the concrete government's function department, they face actually the main question is the social security management system question, if has to be perfect and the consummation management system, the moral hazard probability can reduce. Two is the enterprise is important in the system. The enterprise refuses to participate in the social security, the social insurance fund origin can sever behind, and the social security fund can not operate. Therefore, this paper does discuss the enterprise to run away the expense, and how to reduce the moral hazard question through Perfect social security management system.