Based On Mathematical Model Analysis Of The Moral Hazard Of Insurance Industry To Avoid

With the development of our country insurance industry, there are many problems in the insurance agent market, such as making insincere insurance policies, concealing the insured risk, misleading and deceiving the insured and so on. The moral hazard has seriously affected the healthy development of the insurance industry, because insurance agent just does not work hard for the quality of achievement but the quantity of achievement, and illegally works for short-term benefit.On the one hand, the systematic reason is that the benefit is different and the information is asymmetry in the principal-agent system which is constructed by the insurer and the insurance agent. On the other hand, the technical reason is that unsuitable management ways are adopted.In order to solve the moral hazard question, the Principal-agent model and the incentive mechanism is established and analyzed. To be classified for the moral hazard in the insurance agent industry, the single-time and the multi-times the Principal-agent model are established. For the single-time incentive contract with the"contribution ratio", four Principal-agent models are established. The"contribution ratio"and the incentive factor are affected together for the moral hazard. The characteristic of the optimum incentive contract is analyzed. For the multi-times incentive contract with the"loss ratio", the various times contracts are contacted with the"loss ratio". The multi-times incentive contracts are the auto-adapted type and the memorable, and two moral hazards are avoided.