The Research On The Generation Of The Local Protective Behavior In The Condition Of The Market Economy In Our Country

The local protective behavior is a kind of behavior that the local government fights the resources for protecting the local partial benefits and takes advantage of the administrative power to carry on the interference and manipulation to the local industry and market in the condition of the market economy in our country. The local protective behavior mainly has the outstanding characteristic of the bias towards the outward products, main factors, property rights,etc.. Although the local protective behavior has the existent reasonableness to a certain degree (because of the objective existence of the local benefits), it's negative effect is more serious than it's positive effect. This text has a foothold in the practical conditions in the condition of the market economy, according to the analytic visual angle of the Game Theory,takes the"prisoner predicament"model of the Game Theory as the analytic tool, sets up the"prisoner predicament"game model between the local governments to explain the local protective behavioral generation, and investigates the way of lightening the local protective behavior.The first part:the theoretical analysis of the local protective behavior in the condition of the market economy in our countryThe subject of the local protective behavior is the local government in the condition of the market economy in our country. The local protective behavior is a kind of the economic behavior of the local government. In fact, it also may take place very much in the related realms, such as the judicial section, news medium,etc.. The local protective behavior has various forms. The local protective degree is varied from different products, industries and regions. The objective of the local government that pursues and maximizes the economic and political benefits itself faces the stipulation of the limited reasonableness. And the objective is influenced by the relation between the local governments that is placed in the economic and political games, is likely to evolve the local protective motive and develop the local protective behavior. In addition, the local protective behavior has the existent reasonableness to a certain degree. So we may lighten the local protective behavior.