Capital structure lies on the efficiency of corporate governance. It's the result of games relationship between Stakeholders, especially stockholders and manager, and decided by the resultant force of them.As the separation of ownership and operating rights, stockholders and manager exists potential interest conflict which may be reflected on capital structure. But virtually, stockholders and manager can't contact directly, so this paper judges directorate as the representative of stockholders and reflects the relationship among stockholders, manager and directorate on capital structure innovatively. It establishes Structure Equation Model to test the interactive functional mechanism among them, and reflects how manger and directorate influence capital structure preferably.This paper mainly draws these empirical conclusions: (1) Manager has motivation to change the capital structure. Equity financing accords mangers interests better, but it may have different conclusions if considering single interest index. (2) Directorate is the core of corporate governance. The main function is to dominant manager's action on behalf of stockholders. But the empirical result shows that directorate hasn't done its work very well in whole, it also exposures that there are some limitations about directorate. (3) Directorate can influence capital structure indirectly through manager, and adjust the impact of managerial self-interest on capital structure. |