Game Analysis Of Reverse Logistics

The environmental deterioration and shortage of resources has become the challenge for world's sustainable development. The waste product reverse logistics has the advantages of saving resources, reducing environmental pollution and promoting circular economy development, which have become the focus that social public pays attention. However, the conflicts among enterprises, government and consumers in waste product reverse logistics construction and implementation may hamper the system performance. In this dissertation, these problems were studied basing on game theory; the main contents are as followed:Firstly, Under the condition that remanufacturing is profitable, this paper analyses how the remanufacturing enterprises to obtain the competitive advantages, to keep the competitive advantages, and to reverse the competitive disadvantages when it is leader or follower, basing on complete and incomplete information dynamic game. The main results show that remanufacturing enterprise could gain super profit to accumulate competitive strength and have first mover advantages to expand competitive advantages when it is leader; The followers could reverse the competitive disadvantages with advantages of remanufacturing level.Secondly, According to consumers'heterogeneity of the demand for new and remanufactured products, this paper establishes two decision-making models of remanufacturing about cooperative game and non-cooperative game, solving and comparing the optimal results of the two cases. The changing trends of the remanufacturing cost and the return rate of used products with the customer preference coefficient are analyzed. The results show that cooperative game is better for reducing remanufacturing cost and improving remanufactured products'market share, both two products' price is lower in non-cooperative game, and when the customer preference is high the remanufacturing cost would increase and the return rate would decrease.Thirdly, this paper adopts the frequent exams as government's strategies and the return rate of used products as manufacturer's strategies, introduces environment loss coefficient and incentive coefficient to improve benefit functions. According to different decision-making order, this paper builds up synchronized decision game mechanism, government first decision game mechanism and manufacturer first decision game mechanism. The stability of three mechanisms and social problems may be caused are analyzed under different environment loss coefficient and incentive coefficient .The results show that the government and enterprises' credibility is the foundation of game mechanism normal operation. The win-win situation would be achieved when the government adjusts incentive coefficient to match environment loss coefficient.Fourthly, this paper analyses the impact of government supervision on manufacturer, retailer and consumer basing on Perth closed-loop supply chain models with product remanufacturing are studied under manufacturer and retailer-Nash market, manufacturer-Stackelberg market, retailer-Stackelberg market. By solving manufacturer and retailer's pricing structure with manufacturing costs and the maximum retail price, the changing trends of wholesale price, retail price, profits and sales are analyzed, giving some references to the government for their policy making.