Research Of Eliminating And Restricting Competition Behaviors In Drug Market After Patent Expires

The problem of inadequate and overly expensive medical care has become a prominent social problem nowadays. One of the most significant reasons of this problem is High Drug Prices. Many scholars have explored this issue. Some of them blame it on drug production systems, drug distribution systems and medical health system. Others blame it on the pricing mechanism and price regulation systems of drugs. Apart from these reasons above, technology also has a significant impact on drug price. The intellectual property right of technology, especially the patent right, can influence the drug prices directly. The patent protection of pharmaceuticals can help the big pharmaceutical companies avoid the competition from generic drugs legally. After the patent expires, the price of patent medicine will decrease because the generic drugs can come to the market. But the actual situation of China is that the major blockbuster drugs company can sustain higher pricing because the cheaper generic alternatives can not come to the market. What is the important barrier of it?As a kind of special product, the price of drugs directly relates peoples'health and safety. Some kinds of drugs are non-substitutable in specific therapeutic areas. Their demand price elasticity is very low. The price and supply quantity of these drugs will have a directly influence to the potential consumers'life quality and safety. Lamivudine is a typical example. Although China is the major producers of the Lamivudine APIs and Lamivudine's patent protection has expired, the generic alternatives of Lamivudine has not came to market yet. Patients of China have to bear not only the high price but also the risk of supply-stopping.The innovation of this paper lies in the analysis of eliminating and restricting competition behaviors conducted by some major multinational pharmaceutical companies after the patent expires, which would influence Chinese pharmaceutical industry and drug price. The corresponding countermeasures are put forward at the end of this paper. This paper concerns the problem of drug price after patent expires and presents a new analysis angle and theoretical support to the problem of High Drug Price. The content of this paper involves antitrust economics and industrial economics.The main content of this paper and the structure are as follows:The first chapter mainly introduced the thesis-choosing background, the research situations home and abroad, the innovation points and the analysis frame.The second chapter introduced the characteristics, the industry chain and the market structure of pharmaceutical industry. After the basic patents expire, multinational pharmaceutical companies often build their monopoly power through peripheral patent. Although the independent research and development ability of China is not strong, we have advantages in chemical raw material medicine production. After the drug patent expires, the market structure of pharmaceutical industry should be oligopoly or monopolistic competition.The third chapter analyzes the eliminating and restricting competition behaviors conducted by some major multinational pharmaceutical companies after the patent expires and the influence of these behaviors. Familiar with the international intellectual property rules, multinational pharmaceutical companies often try their best to delay the generic drug reaching the market by virtue of technological superiority, in order to prolong their dominant market position and seize the excess profit. The entry forestalling behaviors of multinational pharmaceutical companies includes patent covering and strengthening strategy, infringement of patent and affecting government policies.The fourth chapter presents the patent infringement lawsuit between Heng Rui Medicine Company and Sanofi-Aventis Group and analyzes malicious abuse of civil proceedings and its influence in detail. Although this lawsuit looks like a common civil litigation problem, it is a kind of eliminating and restricting competition behavior substantially. The multinational pharmaceutical companies use the patent infringement litigation to increase the cost of its competitor.Taking Lamivudine for example, the fifth chapter analyzes the behavior of stopping potential competitors entering in detail. Although GlaxoSmithKline has lost Lamivudine's patent protection, the behavior of stopping potential competitors entering conducted by GlaxoSmithKline help it prolong its dominant market position and sustain the higher price.The sixth chapter introduces the experience of foreign countries, including the relevant legal system of American, the generic drugs development experience of India and the action of Australian government. We can use the antitrust law of China to restrain the eliminating and restricting competition behaviors, and take measures to patent invalidation etc multinational pharmaceutical enterprise of malicious prosecution. gives deal with multinational pharmaceutical enterprise exclude and restrict competition behavior of feasible measures. Mainly introduces the American in seeking patent medicine with generics common development of legislation and law enforcement experience, Indian generics development experience and the Australian government action. Can use the anti-monopoly law to restrain exclude and restrict competition behavior, and take measures to patent invalidation etc multinational pharmaceutical enterprise of malicious prosecution.The last chapter gives the conclusion of this paper and puts forward the policy recommendations. We should encourage competitive and prevent monopoly. Take the advantages of chemical raw material medicine production and enhance the ability of independent innovation. Upgrade China's anti-monopoly law and strengthen cooperation between the different departments. Enhance the ability of using intellectual property right system.