Study On Repayment Incentive Mechanism In Network Joint-liability Loan

Providing that SMEs(small-and-medium-sized enterprises) have always been plagued by the difficulty in financing, this paper analyzes network joint-liability loan, which is a brand new financing product. Based on 102 questionnaires from alibaba, this paper try to analyse risk assortative matching and key factors effecting repayment performance after the loan disbursement, applying models such as logit model, cluster analysis and entropy method.Empirical analysis proves the risk assortative matching phenomenon which is proposed by theory. After the loan disbursement, the analysis finds that the better the repayment performance will be, if the borrowers run safer business, exert stronger peer pressure, been controlled more by staff of the loan institution and show more willingness for peer support. The borrowers'repayment performance can be improved only if clients build groups of similar investment risk. Other group characteristics have no impact. Moreover, the analysis surprisingly finds several results, that the exchange of business information among group members is more a corrective measure than a preventive one; business correlation is more a convex quadratic function with repayment perfornance rather than a linear relationship; the default cost from network information disclosure does not breach the ideal level.Rare as the research in this domain, the research results of this paper will be a reference material for the operation of network joint-liability loan in alibaba and follow-up study.