Study Of Agriculture-Related Enterprise Credit Risk Control Based On Behavioral Finance Theory

The scale of mortgage loan that takes farm produce as mortgage have risen year by year in bank assets, with the increasing price of grain in recent years. Whether the risk is exist in this kind of mortgage credit business for commercial banks? If it does, what's the deep-seated reason? And meantime, a new problem about management and control of credit assets in banking is brought forward.In this paper, we described the risk management and control mode of agriculture-related loans in the banking, analyzed the status of agriculture-related enterprises financing and the form of collateral systematically. According to the characteristics of agriculture-related enterprises financing and the banking cases of non-performing loans, we can conclude that the credit risk of agriculture-related enterprises is mainly due to the price fluctuations of agricultural collateral, and analyze the abnormal price fluctuations in the perspective of behavioral finance. In order to confirm whether there is risk in the collateral loans of agriculture-related enterprises or not, we analyzed the price of soybean futures. Through analyzing the conduct of investors in grain futures market by using behavioral finance theory, we proved that there are anchoring error and framing error among the investors in current soybean futures market. The mispricing in the agricultural futures market passes to the spot market, and leads to the price fluctuations of agricultural products in the spot market. As a result, the banking that accepts agricultural products as collateral must bear a greater credit risk.In order to offer reference for decision-making on credit risk for the banking, the risk is proved by discussing mortgage credit of agricultural enterprises, and the suggestions about management and control of mortgage credit for agricultural enterprises are advanced, by way of combining theoretical research and empirical analysis.