Does Positional Incentives Of Management Affect Company Performance?

Motivation theory is one of hot points in the corporation governance field, on which most study paper focus on salary and stock option incentives. However, In China the listed companies, most of which are transformed from state-owned enterprises, is still in the transition period. Their agent Chain is unique, including the agency and an administrative agency. Operators encourage more unregistered incentives—promotion, and less salary incentives, so salary and stock option incentives cannot reflect the result of all about executives inspire. That is why inspire mechanism in stated public listed company defers from those in other listed company. Thus, this paper, based on the contract theory, the ultimate control nature and the management theory, study the political incentives of state-owned listed company's senior management staff(chairman and general manager), and hope to help develop inspire mechanisms of stated-owned public listed company. The result is that(1)the political motivation to chairman is effective to some degree, the two choice promotion and parallel and the company's performance are relevant, but the choice "to private enterprise" is negative relevant to performance; (2) the four choice of general manager are negative to performance; (3)the chairman and general director's working period is relative to company's performance, but two blend may have a negative impact to the company performance.