Application Study On Economic Value Added (EVA) System In High-tech Enterprises Of Our Country

Because of its special superiority, EVA system has drawn extensive concern of the domestic and international theory and practice circle. Many foreign big enterprises applied EVA to their management systems, and have achieved remarkable results. To be in line with international standards quickly, we should use the value-management system—EVA into our enterprises, which will change managers'concept and improve the enterprises'performance. But, can EVA really become a powerful manage tool for the enterprises in our country? Can we establish the EVA system which is suitable with the enterprises'real conditions? Based on the essential of EVA, I studied the application value of EVA in high-tech enterprises of China from the viewpoint of performance measurement and incentive mechanism.Firstly, through the collected data of IT enterprises in Chinese stock market from 2000 to 2002, I empirically analyze the validity of EVA. The result indicates that (i) EVA is significantly related with the traditional accounting performance indices, e.g. EPS, ROE and NI ; (ii) When the scale of enterprise is considered, capital efficiency (EOA) is significantly related with EPS, ROE and NI; (iii) In these three years, the correlation coefficient of EVA and market value added (MVA) dropped year by year, and did not increas with reduction of Chinese stock market"bubble"; (iv) In 2000, the EVA index system and the traditional accounting index system are separately significantly related with MVA at 0.01 level. Then, it is effective and feasible to introduce EVA system into our performance measurement index system.Secondly, in the perspective of"economic profit", I introduced EVA to the study of executive incentive mechanism in listed companies of China. In view of IT industry's important role and function in national economy under the information economy, I investgated the relationship between executive incentive and enterprise's performance. On one hand, I examined the relations among chairman holding share or not, getting pay or not and value-creation of enterprise respectively. On the other hand, I empirically analyzed the relation between top manager's incentive and enterprise's performance. The result shows that (i) Chairman compensation and chairman shareholding have no obvious obviously influence on enterprise's performance; (ii) Top manager's total annual pay is significantly and positively related with MVA and EPS respectively, and the proportion of personnel who holds share is significantly and positively related with...