Games Analysis And Countermeasure Research Of Moral Hazard In Health Insurance Market

The present management condition of health insurance shows that not only in our country but also the western developed country with more than one hundred year management history, health insurance is high-paying rate, high-cost, and unprofitable. As a result of its own management characteristics, the health insurance market has many participants mainly including insurers, medical institutions and insurants. In addition, the information among the participants is asymmetrical seriously. Above all of that induces moral hazard exists in the health insurance market widely, which mainly represents itself in two aspects: medical institutions'derivational demand and insurants'excessive consumption.Moral hazard is very harmful to the society. It has wasted the medical resources excessively, and made the fee-for-service, separated from the level of the medical safeguard, mount up malignantly, which will increase insurers'management cost and societal burden. Furthermore, moral hazard also twists the normal relationship between doctors and patients, leads to discrimination and inequality, worsens the relationship between doctors and patients, and even affects the medical service to be provided normally.As for the insurers, the securest measure to avoid moral hazard and reduce the fee-for-service is nothing better than supervising the medical institutions and insurants synchronously. However, it is not the prepreerence strategy. It comes to light that surveillance needs a great deal of manpower, material and financial resources, which will augment the running expenses of insurance companies. This article analyzes the relationship between insurers, medical institutions and insurants based on the theory of Game and principal-agent. The conclusion can be drawn that the key for avoiding moral hazard is how to strengthen the supervision to medical institutions.Based on the Games analysis and the overseas experience, this paper brings forward some specific suggestions and measures to shun moral hazard. Insurance companies should set up the pooling-of-interest incentive mechanisms with medical institutions, and restrict insurants' behavior by contract. At the same time, the insurers themselves should improve the management level. Moreover,the government should also take measures to perfect laws and regulations.