A Research On The Shareholding Motivation Effect

As a kind of long-term stimulation, shareholding motivation has been prevalence in west. With the conversion of Chinese economy system, shareholding motivation is introduced into many domestic enterprises gradually. However, whether or not owning stock can stimulate the executives, how this stimulation being represented as a change of the corporate performance, what kind of relationship between the executives' share holding ratio and the corporate performance, this paper studies all these issues both from theoretic and positivismic aspect.The paper discusses the origin, practice, meaning, characters and types of shareholding motivation first, and defines it as a series of rules aim at long-term stimulation, by which the owners give up part of the ownership and entitle the executives to benefit from the shareholding, by this means, the corporrate value can be increased.Then, the paper emphasizes the final effect lie on the summation of the two effects of the shareholding motivation ("interest alignment" and "interest entrenchment") . Subsequently, the paper probes several standards and selects the corporate performance as the criterion which can measure the effect quantificationally.In the next part, we fix our demonstration on the 537 companies of which executives' shareholding information has been published. The whole demonstration include two processes. The first demonstration process was "mean compare" and "T-test", after this step, we draw a conclusion that shareholding motivation affects corporate performance negatively. The second demonstration process was "regression analysis", By using the cube equation, we regress out the function expression and figure out the increasive and degressive interval.