Ultimate Owners,Concentration Of Ownership And Corporate Performance

This article uses"the principle of ultimate ownership"to redefine the ownership structure of China's listed companies. Through the comparison of operating performance of the listed companies affiliated to different ultimate owners, we find that, on the condition of the weak legal and market environment, state ownership may not less effective than private ownership, and the government motivation & behavior has really frustrated the SOEs. It indicates the way to raise the efficiency of the state ownership was establishing a more rational benefit distribution relationship, enhancing monitoring, eliminating administrative monopoly, ending the exceeding- economic protection of SOEs, so that the state ownership can do as the private ownership do. This paper consists of four chapters. The framework of this article is as follows:The first chapter conducts the literature review on the relationship between ownership structure, ownership concentration, government motivation & behavior and the corporate performance. Recently researchers have shifted their focus to the influence of ultimate owners.The second chapter classifies the listed companies into five groups according to their ultimate owners. And then analyzes the character and their influence on the corporate governance of different ultimate owners, which finally reflected in the operating performance. Remarkably, this paper uses"Principal Components Analysis"to reduce an integrative factor to measure corporate performance, which avoid the fault of both single profit index and multi-indices.The third chapter is to observe the ultimate owners, different function by comparing the performance indices between the listed companies affiliated to different ultimate owners, and the by regression. Furthermore, differs the function in different ownership concentration.In the end part of the article comes the conclusion and the suggestion.