The Ownership, Control Of Ultimate Owner And Performance

1932, Berle and Means publish a publications"modern companies and private property rights",pointing out that the large U.S. company's ownership and control are separated, the control of large companies in the hands of managers. This notability thesis guided that the Western economists qua dispersive ownership and control as a core when they research the corporate governance ,according to American-style"strong managers, weak shareholder"more than half a century.In 1990s corporate ownership and control rights has always been one of hot issues in finance.Some researchers,such as Laporta,showed evidence that to some extent corporate ownership around the world is concentrated. Therefore,recent researches on corporate governance are almost based on this Laporta hypothesis, and the focus of study turnes to protecting minority shareholders'interest, preventing controlling shareholders from extracting private benefit,and accordingly fostering the development of capital market.Ownership structure of China's listed corporate has some unique characteristics, for instance highly concentrated ownership and a lot of non-tradable shares, so it seems that researches on this field should lie on Laporta hypothesis.Thus, with Laporta hypothesis adopted in this paper, I manage to find out ultimate owners of China's listed companies and their ownership (cashflow right) and control rights (voting rights). Moreover, the relationship between ultimate owners, including their ownership, control rights, and corporate performance has been studied.This thesis be going to analyze, according to the Securities and Futures Commissions request, listed company disclose the detailed information about the ultimate owners'information through chart which can retrospect to ultimate owners since 2004.What's the state of ownership structure in China's listed companies? Does the phenomena which cashflow rights and control rights is separate still exist? How bad it is?The influence of Ownership structure is"convergence-of-interests effect"or"tunneling"?This paper consists of four chapters.Chapters 1: An introduction that covers areas: research objectives, theoretical and practical value, contents and framework.Chapters 2:Empirical literature review. This chapter briefly introduces empirical papers home and abroad on concerning field, and provides foundation for empirical study in this paper.Chapters 3:Empirical literature review.This chapter briefly introduces empirical papers home and abroad on concerning field.Chapters 4:Procedure and results of empirical study on the relationship between ownership and control rights of the ultimate owners and the performance of listed companies in China.In this paper, relying on science and technology projects in Sichuan Province soft problem "after the share reform, the relationship between ultimate controlling shareholder, Concentration of ownership and enterprise value of Listed Companies in China(2008ZR0050).We choose the 188 listed companies which have Completed the Split share structure reform in 2005 in the cities of Shenzhen and Shanghai (A shares) from 2004 to 2007 for four consecutive years of data as samples.Through stake in the ultimate control structure map, we cast back the ultimate owners, we analyse the effect and the relationship between ultimate controlling shareholder, Concentration of ownership and enterprise value, the extent of the degree of deviation ultimate influence the corporate performance, the differences of different types of ultimate owners influence the corporate performance.The results could be summed up as follows: Firstly, the cashflow rights has a positive correlation with the firm performance, it shows that the performance of sample companies increase with cashflow rights.The cashflow rights of ultimate owners will produce"convergence-of-interests effect". This is equivalent to the role of an incentive to the ultimate owners. It means that the more Cashflow rights the better operate of the company.thus increasing its wealth. Secondly, the control rights has a positive correlation with the firm performance, it shows that the performance of sample companies increase with control rights. It means that the more control rights the better operate of the company. Thirdly, the relationship between the degree of deviation and the corporate performance assume as U-type. At first, the performance of sample companies decrease with cashflow rights, with the degree of deviation keep on increasing, Corporate performance rather than an upward trend after having been a turning point. Finally, the differences of different types of ultimate owners influence the corporate performance shows that, the performance of sample companies increase with cashflow rights of non-state ultimate owners, no matter ultimate owners are non-state or state owned listed companies, the performance of sample companies increase with control rights.