Research On The Effect Of Transferences Of Corporate Control To The Performance Of Listed Companies

From the static eyes on, control rights were the structures and situations; However, from the dynamic eyes on, they were rings of procedures and mechanisms of control rights transferring. As the "genes" of modern companies, control rights' having been effectively distributed was the key and core of solving the corporate governance, and strengthening the control rights mechanisms was the practical choices and strategic trends of improving the corporate governance. In Chian stock market, lots of list companies were charged by large shareholders. To control and reduce the cost of large shareholder governence, it defines to the market for corporate control in China. So this paper will focus on the siginificance of cultivating a an effcient market of corporate control, which can carry out exterior mechanism and resource allocation function, in fact, about performance of the market of corpotae control in China.The number of event of corporate control transferring increased at 70% during last few years. But in the back of this flourishing phenomena, it show out a low performance market. The special sotck property strctures and incomplete law and system environment decide the same opportunistic conduct operated by both corporate control suppliers and buyers and made the stock market become only financing approach for list companies instead of efficient carrier of market for corporate control.After comparing The Event Studies and The Accouting Studies, considered of the problem of information nosies and distortion, this paper applies the later one to do empirical analysis. According to researches done before, this paper absorbes eight financial index to value corporate performance. Using the factor analysis method, four main component were get and the socore for the list companies which change their large shareholders can be calculated. Analysis the changing trend of their scores, it's shown that after the transferring, the performance seems to rebound strongly in next year but soonly get down. Because of useless of market for corporate control, corpotae takeover didn't equal to threat. The transferring didn't change the real performance and operation of list companies in fact, and the function of exteriormechanism and the optimization of social resource allocation hasn't work very well.When it mentions about the reboud in the next year after the transferring, it need to know the real structure of return source. The contribution made by profit from main operations is just a small part of the increase and it cann't maintain. In contrast, durative investment income and non-operating revenue play important roles in the rebound. So earning management conduct after corporate control transferring were notable and its two popular way are capital reorganization and non-opreating revenue. In conclusion,"Wealth Transfer Hypothesis"adapt to China corporate control market. The transferrings were just wealth allocation game, frome one large sharrholder to another one, with no real social weath producing. The great loss and the cost of transferrings are accepted by minority shareholders.According to empirical and theory analysis, it's recommended that the stock innovation practised now is good to ameliorate stock property structures which exsited for long time. Also to improve the efficiency of performance valuation system and law restriction and the functions of directorate are useful ways to meliorate the market for corporate control in China.