Demonstration Between Securities Investment Fund Governance Structure And Performance

Being a new type of financial institution fund plays an important role in the current and instrument, security investment economy and society. The domestic academe has produced plenty of researches on the structure of company management, but we are the beginner for the theory of funds management structure. I argue that not only there are important theoretical meanings through the deep study on the fund governance, but also the faultiness of fund governance will restrict the development of fund industry, violate the interests of fund investors and may bring the systematic problems for the industry.The development of fund industry in China is still in its initial stage, so the study on the governance structure of securities investment funds must also be fully considered at these stage characteristics. From the perspective of fund relationship governance, this paper uses the theory of corporate governance on the study of the governance structure of securities investment funds. Firstly, I introduce the basic concepts, characteristics and the main varieties of investment fund, then focusing on the analysis of the theoretic basis: Principal-Agent theory. Through choosing open-end funds as the sample on the security market at present in our country, I have studied the structure governance of the security investment fund and try to establish an empirical connection between funds governance and performance. Meanwhile, it tries to put forward the Chinese funds models in terms of the Western experience and suggestions to improve the funds governance of our country. At last, correspondingly to those shortages existing in Chinese investment fund governance, the article provides some tactics to solve them.