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The Empirical Study Of CEO Compensation Incentives Of The Family-controlled Listed Company

Posted on:2008-11-03Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:W F XueFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189360215495667Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The family business, which is one kind of important enterprise form, is playing the important role all the time in human being history of development of society. After the reform and openness in our country, family businesses develop swiftly, and drive the economic growth rapidly. But with family firm quantity increasing by and the scale expansion, many family businesses have encountered the question lacking of the management resource. How to stimulate effectively managers has become focus.This study takes family-controlled listed companies in 2005 in f stock market for example, and examines the relation of CEO compensation and performance, the factors affecting the compensation, the compensation level and sensitivity of pay to performance between family CEOs and nonfamily CEOs.The result shows that CEOs salary is positively related to OPE, and stock ownership is not insignificantly related to firm performance; that CEOs salary is positively related to size and CEO tenure; not related to stock ownership and ROE; and not insignificantly related to industry dummy. Studying result also indicates that compensation levels of family CEOs are not lower than that of nonfamily CEOs; that the compensation of family CEOs is less sensitive to performance than that of nonfamily CEOs.Finally, author puts forward advises from government and enterprise.
Keywords/Search Tags:family firm, compensation incentive, principal-agent
PDF Full Text Request
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