| The stock market in our country has some attribute of transforming. Many scholars hold that our stock market is not efficient enough (Xiaoyue, Chen(1997);Changwen, Zhao(2000)),which shows information of the stock market is not available and transparent. So the stock market can not supervise the listed private-controlled companies. This is mainly partly because the economy in our country grows and new companies sprang, in addition to our government's support, private-controlled companies have expanded from quantity to scale and initiated public option(IPO),manager-bought option(MBO), bought-shells(BS) listed private-controlled companies increase as well; partly because the law on the share-holder protection is scarce and many controlling share-holder in listed private-controlled companies grab illegal profits called private benefits of control from small-median share-holders .The controlling share-holder of the listed private-controlled companies hold the control rights through Pyramid structure which is a typical character of the listed private-controlled companies and it help the controlling share-holders'grabbing deeds hard to be discovered and make the grabbing more serious. The collapse of Delong-link companies, De-long ,Xinjiang, have corrupted which shows an example of our stock market. The listed private-controlled companies how to make use of stock market to raise money ,how to attract investors and expand the scale of the companies ,how to improve corporation vale ; meanwhile , the administration of the stock market how to deal with the distortion deeds of the controlling share-holder when they are lack of capital. To perfect the institution of stock market and improve the corporate governance of the listed companies especially the listed private-controlled companies is a long-term task.The paper has five parts.The first part is the introduction and it traces back the research on control right home and aboard as well as defines the objects in this paper which serve as the base of the latter part of the paper. The second part is an important part of the paper, it discovered that"the controlling shareholder"and"lower control right"exist in the same listed private-controlled companies through the statistics like the share structure ,the control right structure and the pyramid share-holding structure .The third part is the main part of the paper.Based on the assumption and the data, it found that the positive effect of the first share-holder to the company value is not so severe, the effect of the separation of control right and the cash flow right origins from the pyramid structure to the company value is negative , the effect of liquid share price and the unliquid share price to the company value is positive. The fourth part is attached to the third part and it explains the reason of the phenominom of the lower control right and the reason of the negative effect of the control right to company value from the transformation reform , the defect of the stock market ,the lack of laws and the Asian culture. The last part proposes how to supervise the controlling share-holder and how to overcome the moral hazard of the controlling share-holder to improve the company value. |
