An Empirical Study On Control Premium In The Transfer Of Listed Enterprises' Control Rights To Private Enterprises

M&A to be aimed at obtaining the control rights has emerged more and more, while, it was reflected in innumerable cases' study that target enterprises' value after being merged hasn't increased, it was just the other way round from the long-term perspective. The motivation of acquiring the list enterprises' control rights is not maximizing the corporate value, but to get the unreasonable private benefits of control, by decomposing the control premium and analyzing how it is respectively influenced by the elements affecting the coordination effects and the private benefits of control, we can study the sample of list corporations merged by private enterprises and the true motivation of the transfer of control rights.Besides, in the process of empirical research, comparing with the control premium based on net assets adopted by other researchers, this paper uses the distance from share value to the transferring price to represent the control premium. Meanwhile, it will be more comprehensive here taking the coordinate motivation into consideration chiefly demonstrated by the M&A type, additional to the elements of private benefits of control.We can find that the influence to control premium caused by ingredients affecting the coordinate motivation is far less than the elements affecting the acquirement of private benefits of control, which means the transfer of control rights is to obtain the private benefits of control rather than the coordination effects. Among which, there are Herfindahl₁0 index indicating the restriction between shareholders, current shares' percentage and the former controlling shareholder's shares which effects are comparably biggest, but what's a pity is most domestic scholars didn't take the restraint from other shareholders into account. It is also turned out in this paper that the independent directors don't work very well due to the little connection with the control premium. Besides, there're also some rough descriptive statistics indicating that almost all controlling shareholders plundered the list enterprises' fund after the transfer of control rights, which demonstrates the control rights' transfer is motivated by acquiring private benefits of control chiefly.Because of lacking relevant research data after share-divided reform, a systematic analyst on the control premium can't be done now.