A Study On The Control Transfer Of SOEs,Private Benefits Of Control Rights And Enterprise Impressions Management

This study is based on the following four backgrounds.Firstly,with the proposal of comprehensively deepening the reform strategy,the reform of state-owned enterprises as the "key event" is closely related to the improvement of the country’s comprehensive competitiveness,and has received strong attention from the whole society.However,academic research on state-owned enterprise reform has long term focused on the issue of the change in efficiency after the control transfer,the research in other directions has yet to be deepened.Secondly,the existing conclusions about the economic consequenc-es of SOE reform are inconsistent.Exploring the real motives of private controlling shareholders to obtain control of state-owned enterprises is necessary.Thirdly,the cor-porate social reputation are usually not enjoyed by the new controlling shareholder with the transfer of control rights,that is,after the state-owned enterprise is changed to pri-vate holding enterprises need to establish a new reputation mechanism.At present,there is little research in this area.Lastly,at this stage,listed companies use various earnings management methods to "whitewash" financial statements,and how capital market par-ticipants truly evaluate the control transfer of state-owned enterprises.Based on the above backgrounds,this paper proposes a theoretical analysis framework for the control transfer of state-owned enterprises and enterprise impression management,introduces the private benefits of control rights and market evaluation,empirically tests the analyt-ical framework and assumptions,and expects to extract the effectiveness of the reform of state-owned enterprises from the empirical results.This study includes the following contents.Firstly,from the perspective of private benefits of control,analyzes the real motives of private controlling shareholders to ob-tain control of state-owned enterprises.Secondly,from the perspective of impression management theory,the paper analyzes the impression management behavior of private controlling shareholders after get the control rights of state-owned enterprises.Thirdly,from the perspective of evaluation of the effect,the institutional investors’ shareholdings are used as indicators to analyze the evaluation of the control transfer of state-owned enterprises.The research conclusions of this dissertation are as follows:First,the related party transaction is regarded as a measure of the private benefits behavior of the private controlling shareholder.After the control transfer of the state-owned enterprise,the private controlling shareholder has carried out more private benefits.In general,no matter which way to obtain control of state-owned enterprises,it will cost a large amount of private capital.Private controlling shareholders often treat economic interests first.Therefore,more related party transaction satisfies their own economic interests and meets the private benefits of control.Further research found that the level balance mechanism of shareholding cannot significantly inhibit the related transactions of private controlling shareholders.When the state-owned capital is less than 3%,the private controlling shareholders conduct more related transactions.Second,the transfer of control of state-owned enterprises is significantly positively related with corporate impression management.After the control transfer of state-owned enterprises,private controlling shareholders have carried out more corporate impression management,which proves that impression management behavior can satisfy the pri-vate interests of controlling shareholders.The state-owned shares are reserved for more than 3%or reduced to less than 3%,the control transfer of state-owned enterprises is significantly positively related with the management of corporate impressions.It proves that after the transfer of control rights,the decision-making power of private controlling shareholders is not affected by the state-owned capital.On the other hand,also proves that impression management is also a positive behavior for the company as a whole,in addition to being beneficial to the actual controller,so it is not affected by the equity level.Third,the proportion of institutional investors’ shareholdings is used as an evalua-tion of effect of state-owned enterprises control transfer.It is found that the shareholding ratio of institutional investors is significantly reduced after the control transfer of state-owned enterprises.Shareholding ratio of institutional investors reduced are obviously in the group of the state-owned capital is under 3%.The contributions and innovations of this article are mainly reflected in the fol-lowing aspects:First,this paper provides a new research perspective and empirical evidence for the private motive shareholders to obtain the control of state-owned enterprises and the economic consequences of the control transfer of state-owned enterprises.In the exist-ing research,the research on the control transfer of state-owned enterprises focuses on enterprise value,performance,policy burden,soft budget constraints and innovation,and the conclusions of the research are not consistent.There is no deep empirical evi-dence for the inconsistent results of the empirical test of state-owned enterprise reform.Based on the novel perspective of private income of controlling shareholders,this paper reveals the true motive of private capital to obtain control of state-owned enterprises,and the motive may be the main reason of inconsistency in existing research conclu-sions.Second,this paper studies the motives of impression management of private con-trolling shareholders by means of the control transfer of state-owned enterprises.It is one of the few studies to establish cross-exploration in the field of finance and sociology to carry out research on corporate impression management.It expands research in the field of control transfer of state-owned enterprises and impression management.The research on the impression management behavior of private controlling shareholders not only reveals the motivation of the controlling shareholder’s impression management behavior,but also helps the future research to better understand this field.Third,this paper enriches the research on the related fields of evaluation of effect with state-owned enterprise control transfer.Although many scholars have conducted a lot of research on the economic consequences of state-owned enterprise reform,few studies have examined the capital market’s evaluation of the state-owned enterprises’control transfer.Actually the capital market is the current mainly place that state-owned enterprise control transfer.The research in this paper is a useful supplement to related fields.