The Minor Private Enterprises Credit Financing Dilemma Under Imperfect Information

Private minor enterprises need to get credit capital outside in their progress of scale-rization, since their capital accumulation is insufficient. Credit capital is still the main source in private minor enterprises financing. How to solve the credit dilemma of private minor enterprises is key purpose in this paper. In the theory of information economics and game, the paper analyzes the credit dilemma of private minor enterprises.On the base of characters of credit market in China, a comprehensive monopoly credit market model is built under the situation: interest rate and mortgage are both variable. On the situation, we analyze two equilibriums: separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium. Then we can get the conclusion that mortgage or credit guarantee is necessary in private minor enterprises financing. The fourth chapter has analyzed the effect of credit guarantee in the privately minor enterprise credit financing market. Under different risk-averse utility function of bank and credit guarantee organization, we study how to distribute the credit risk between them. Finally, the paper point out that our country credit guarantee organization present situation is affected by three key factors: interest rate r , proportion of credit guaranteeη, credit guarantee rate g and the average credit market risk rate p . Then according the realistic situation in China, the paper discusses the reasons which make credit guarantee institution in dilemma. If bank could recognize each enterprise risk, there wouldn't be"credit rationing". However, in fact, banks can't recognize each enterprises risk. Under asymmetrical information, how to utilize the informational advantage of bank, establish effective and long term relationships through bank and private minor enterprises to solve the problem of credit financing. The fourth chapter study on the relationship credit financing. We analyze the relationship credit financing in China from two aspects: customers-managed bank system and the structure of bank system.