Credit Rationing Of Farmers Under The Conditions Of Imperfect Information-A Game Theory Perspective

Rural households'credit is an important component of China's rural finance. Along with increasing credit support for agriculture, the difficulty of farmers in getting loans has declined. However, the problem is still serious. More than half of the farmers'demand for credit can not be met from formal financial institutions. The main reason for this situation is information asymmetry between farmers and financial institutions, adverse selection and moral hazard effect on the financial institutions through interest rates, and lead to credit rationing in rural areas. In addition, the lack of adequate and effective collateral, the lack of the credit system of rural households, the lack of effective risk compensation, sharing and transfer mechanisms, worsen the information asymmetry in the rural households'credit.The paper analyses the behavior of credit of rural households in conjunction with rural finance, game theory, credit rationing theory. And then sets up three game models to study the behavior of unsecured rural households'credit, limited guarantees rural households'credit and rural households'credit under conditions of uncertainty respectively. In this paper, there are four proposals to alleviate credit rationing of farmers:(1) Promoting the mutual credit guarantee model and other collective credit vigorously. (2) Attempting to establish a distinctive new loan guarantee system for farmers. (3) Adhering to market-oriented reform of interest rates. (4) Actively exploring the establishment of farmer credit insurance system.