A Study On Incentive And Restraint Mechanisms Of Agent Construction In Government Invested Projects

Government invested projects are the important components of fixed assets in community-wide investments. To solve the drawbacks of integrations of investment, construction, supervision and use in government invested projects and improve government investment efficiency, some provinces and cities have launched agent construction in the field of government invested projects. With the implementation of the agent construction, incentive and restraint mechanisms which were not perfect enough became one of the most important issues in development of agent construction market. In this context, how to guide high-level project management companies to enter the market of agent construction by establishing scientific incentive and restraint mechanisms is becoming an issue worthy of study.The study firstly analyzed the characteristics of agent construction in government invested projects. Through the analysis of the construction models, enterprise agent construction model was focused on in this study. The principal-agent relationship between government investor and agent construction units was studied to find out the principal-agent problems: adverse selection and moral hazard problem. At last, targeted incentive and restraint mechanisms was brought forward.As to the problem of adverse selection, the study established the comprehensive evaluation model using AHP and fuzzy evaluation method on the basis of the literature studies and expert interviews. And the method was applied to Agent Construction Project of Dalian Laoganbu University. It offered reference for selecting agent construction units.As to the problem of moral hazard, dominant incentive and hidden incentive mechanism was studied. Firstly, based on the principal-agent theory, income of government investor's and agent construction units' was analyzed on both the respective symmetric and asymmetric information cases by means of mathematics modeling. The improved dominant incentive mechanism was studied. After studying problems of current dominant incentive mechanism, improved dominant incentive mechanism was brought forward and checked by examples of calculation. Secondly, the agents' strategy was brought out by the reputation model. Some comprehensive measures were put forward to ensure the reputation mechanism play the role.