A Study On Incentive And Restraint Mechanisms Of Participating Subjects In Agent Construction Projects

Over the years， the construction of our country’s invested projects has beenimplementing "investment, construction, management, use " four in one mode ofmanagement. There is a big problem on the system, therefore, the government all over thecountry began to implementing agent system, and obtained remarkable achievement.However, as an advanced management mode introduced from the West, the agent system,is difficult to avoid moral hazard and adverse selection problems in the process ofimplementation. Therefore, how to establish a scientific incentive and restraint mechanismsto guarantee the normal operation of construction projects on behalf of governmentinvestment and the interest of scholars to study to become a hot issue.Standing on government owners, this paper is trying to establish a more reasonablemechanism, through a number of incentive measures to reduce government owners andconflicts of interest between agent company and to guide agent company behavior better forthe owners of the target service. First, through the actual research, the author understood theproblems of construction projects arising from the cooperation, pointed out the problem ofasymmetric information between participants; through the game analysis of the governmentwith collusion body led by the construction agent, clarified that the government owners’sincentive and restraint mechanisms for agent company is necessary; then the authordesigned an agent company incentive and restraint mechanisms, including the generation ofthree aspects including construction management fee structure, risk sharing and reputationalincentives, on behalf of construction management fees primarily by management costs,normal profit, ahead of schedule and project quality bonuses constitute; Finally, the authorgave a research select ed from a project incentive program case.