The Research Of Optimal Insurance Model Under The Asymmetric Information

Serious asymmetric information takes place between our insurer and insured. This paper studies solutions to these moral hazard problems by the mathematics method in our insurance market from the angle of information microeconomics.First of all, the paper gives an introduction concerning information microeconomics, approaches the cause of the moral hazard and the severity of the aftermath in theory, and fully explains the significance and urgency in solving the asymmetrical problem in information in Chinese insurance industry. These models constitute theoretical foundation of countermeasures and suggestions according to the asymmetrical problem in information in Chinese insurance industry. In order to promote the research of the mechanism of moral hazards and the effective precautions and dominations of moral hazard in insurance field, I adopt the game theory, construct the game model. under moral hazard and add the fine into the model, at this moment the Nash-equilibrium point relates to fine, check toll and precaution measure toll, and proves that it is rational and feasible for the insurance company to encourage the insurer by adopting fines to avoid moral hazard.In the second part, we clarified the option characteristics of the deposit insurance from the options'view of point and on the groundwork ,we indicated the deposit insurance is substantively a put option. In addition, we further dissertate how to apply the B-S option pricing model to evaluation of the two-period deposit insurance price. It is found to be prominent in the banks'deposit insurance value, and also examine the effects of capital forbearance and moral hazard behavior in this two-period deposit insurance setting, then can improve monitoring level of bank.