A Research Of Multi-lateral Game In Share-split Reform

Share-split is a particular problem of China security market, it restricts the healthy and benign development of security market, and it is the sticking point for solving deep contradiction of China capital market. The share-split reform which started up on April 29th 2005 unclosed the prelude of multi-lateral game in market; it is a milestone in the development of China stock market.This paper makes a systematic analysis of the share-split reform by using game theory as the chief economic analysis and by absorbing and perfecting the research results on security market home and abroad. Firstly,the paper puts forward its own approach on the basis of the summery and analysis of the development, actuality, the problems of share-split reform and general introduce the multi-lateral game. Secondly, it studies, through setting up complete information dynamic game model, the consideration game process between non-circulating shareholders and circulating shareholders. It finds balanced point of the game by analyzing the avail-functions of non-circulating shareholders and circulating shareholders. It reveals that the faultiness of consideration mechanism is the deep cause of low consideration of blue-chip stocks and high consideration of bad performance stocks in the market. It points out that only establishing continuous procedure for calling price can build up equitableness of consideration game and protect the benefit of circulating shareholders. Finally, the paper founds incomplete information dynamic game model to analyze the signal game between government and market investor and gets the game equilibrium in different condition from each target function. At the same time, it explains the market acting process and put forward that the government should conquer finite sense, reduce its anticipate profit and define investor expectation to decrease system variance cost and promote the share-split reform.