The Behavior And Governance Of Large Shareholders' Tunneling After The Split Share Reform

Before the split shares reform,the large shareholder hollowed out the listed company,carries on the benefit transportation,which is very widespread,its root lies in the big medium and small shareholder's profit mechanism is different,our country carries out the split shares reform and the original intention is alleviates the large shareholder's hollowed out.However,after the split shares reform,the phenomenon of large shareholder's tunneling has not been well improved,and the way of hollowed out has been diversified and concealed,which has brought a lot of losses to the listed companies and small investors,and has affected the healthy development of our capital market.Therefore,it is urgent to study the way of large shareholder's tunneling and its governance in the whole circulation times.This paper sums up the research achievements at home and abroad,and summarizes the three aspects of the main shareholder's tunneling motive and influence,the way of tunneling,the effect of hollowing out and the prevention measures.Then,through the relevant economic theory,it is concluded that the incompleteness of property rights,asymmetric information and the sharing of supervision proceeds are the three fundamental motives for large shareholder to dig empty.Then this article based on the analysis of the system background: Since the reform,the majority shareholder's holding shares can be listed circulation,but China's capital market "one share alone big" and "pyramid-type shareholding structure" mode still exists,leading to the majority of shareholders began to obtain excess capital income to take into account the appropriation,transfer of corporate resources of the way to tunnel.At last,this article statistics the whole circulation times by the supervision department to investigate the large shareholder hollowed out samples,and with the relevant cases of the hollowed out way is classified.After literature review and theoretical analysis,this article starts with the classical case: the large shareholder of the Bairun stock,and the hollowed out process and the tunneling result are analyzed and studied deeply.It is found that the majority shareholder of the company shares profits from the manoeuvre of the Basque equity by means of related transactions,short-term trading,vicious pie,etc.while the interests of other small investors are encroached on and the proportion of shareholding is diluted.Then it concludes with the conclusion that the theory system analysis is consistent,that is,the large shareholder of Bairun shares takes the excess capital income into account and transfers the company resources.In view of this phenomenon,this paper finally puts forward some suggestions on the governance of the large shareholder's tunneling.