The Game Relations Between Central Government And Local Governments In The Process Of Real Estate Macro-control In China

Real estate has some features:It is a limited and non-renewable resource. It has great social benefits.The link between the real estate industry and other industries is very strong, so the stable development of the real estate affects the stability of the entire economy and finance directly.It is an important source of government revenue. Its market is very speculative. These features make it particularly important to control the real estate market from macroeconomic aspect. But the central government and the local governments which have different interests and goals do not coincide in the practice of management of the real estate. Thus there is "government failure" , the intensity and effect of policy are affected. The reason for this phenomenon is the administrative and fiscal decentralization system taken in China's economic transition process. Local government as a representative of the interests of local area often safeguards local interests first regardless of national interests when it can't give consideration to national interests and local interests together. Because real estate is fixed assets which has strong local features, the policies implemented by local governments affect the development of the local real estate certainly.For purposes of properly handling the relationship between central government and local governments,making local governments be conscious to remain healthy development of the real estate industry,resolving the "Decree null and void" problem fundamentally ,reducing "government failures" in order to avoid the volatility of real estate, this dissertation studies the relations and the behaviors of local and central governments in the real estate macro-control in china, explores the factors influencing the game relations between central and local governments, and puts forward some suggestions.In this dissertation,the author analyses the different interests between local governments and central government in the real estate's macro-control process and finds that the real reason of less effective macro-control of real estate is the existence of different interests and the game relations between central government and local governments.While most previous studies of the macro-control policy of the real estate focused on the policy drafting and control means, namely the policy has just been taken as a tool arbitrary controlled by policy makers, and neglected the interdependence and impact between the policy makers and executors.The author thinks one of the important factors impacting the game relations between central government and local government is the deficiencies and imperfections of institution, making the interests relations between the two groups with different interest have not been mediated.