Infection Of Supplier And Producer's Constraints On Quality In Supply Chain Enviornment

The quality of products not only relates with the internal control of a production company, meanwhile, it also relates with the producers'agreement about quality and the aspiration to improve the quality. These kinds of agreement and aspiration directly infect the strategy of producer and the quality of final products of this producer. In the supply chain environment, the aspiration not only comes from the competition of markets and impression of customers, or the enterprise of the entrepreneur, but from the exact environment and constraints that producer faces and the cooperation relationship between producer and supplier. In this context, the factors that can infect the quality strategies of suppliers and producers are divided into natural constraints and contract constraints. These two main factors use different ways to illustrate how the constraints that suppliers and producers confront and the relationship between the constraints infect the supplier-producer strategy and choice. And the paper also analyzes which parameters finally infect the choice of supplier and producer, and analyzes the extent and methods of these infections.In this paper, we presumed that the unbalance of information does not exist. Under this background, we established a supply chain model with one supplier and one producer. We discussed the model and the possible strategy equilibrium when the supplier only has two quality choices and producer chooses to inspect the products. Then, we extend the choice of suppliers to consider when the supplier faced many produce choices what the strategy equilibrium will be like. Finally, we discussed the possible strategy equilibrium when the producer chooses to classify the products into several degrees. The conclusion is that the cooperation between supplier and producer in a supply chain is based on the profits, no one can cooperate without permission of profit. And another conclusion is the reward cooperation type is advanced than the punishment cooperation type.