Debt Constraint?Information Quality And Executive Pay-performance Sensitivity

The development of China's capital market continues to improve,with the increase of capital sources,the financing channels of enterprises become more broad,and the impact of capital supplier on enterprises' s management is also increasing.So in order to obtain a steady external supply of capital,the relevant business decisions have to consider the interests of creditors.Therefore,on the basis of absorbing debt agency cost theory and information transmission theory,this paper studies the relationship between debt constraint,information quality and executive compensation performance sensitivity from the perspective of creditors.This paper will propose new issues and confirmed three issues through reading,combing and summarizing the existing literatuers,Firstly,whether corporate performance has a significant impact on executive compensation,that is,whether there is a performance sensitivity of executive compensation;Secondly whether debt constraints affect the performance sensitivity of executive compensation,Third Does the information quality regulate the relationship between debt constraint and executive compensation performance sensitivity? According to the problems to be solved in this paper,through consulting and combing the relevant literature,this paper proposed three hypotheses,Then by empirical research and hypothesis testing based on A-share listed company from Shen Zhen stock exchange from 2011-2017 in china,using SPSS20.0,this paper reached the conclusions as follows:(1)Research on the relationship between corporate performance and executive compensation.Through sample analysis,in the sample companies,business performance significantly affects executive compensation level,and there is a significant positive correlation between them.(2)Research on the relationship between debt constraint and executive compensation performance.By analyzing we find that In the capital structure of enterprises,debt capital accounts for a relatively high proportion.When debt financing exists in enterprises,there is a negative correlation between debt constraint and executive pay-performance sensitivity;(3)Research on whether the information quality regulate the relationship between debt constraint and executive compensation performance sensitivity.Relative to the quality of reports of lower grade,the restriction of debt constraints on executive compensation performance sensitivity will be reduced in reporting high quality grade enterprises;Due to the nature of enterprise property rights,the moderating effect is different.by dividing the whole sample into two groups,namely the state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed companies,the results show that information quality has different moderating effect on the relationship between debt constraint and executive's pay-performance-sensitivity,which is more significant in the state-owned enterprises.Combined with the relevant research conclusions,this paper puts forward some suggestions,hoping to provide help for the future practice.