Random Game Reseaching Of Stake Incentive With Trustor And Actor

Companies, business development of the Practice has proved that: a determining factor in management, operation and management can upswing, the key lies in the decision-making (clients) on the manager (or agents) the choice of incentives - and restraint mechanisms. At present, the stock option incentive mechanism is the current domestic and foreign manager-led to the governance structure of listed companies of the new features. Stock Option incentive mechanisms for the protection of clients (listed companies) and agents of the two largest revenue is important and significant role. It is the large foreign companies in the "separation of the two" circumstances incentive for the operators and employees to work long-term development of a pay system, but also China's listed companies are actively encouraging a trial - and restraint mechanisms.From the beginning of the 1950s, some U.S. companies began to implement a manager of stock options incentive mechanism, many experts and scholars continue discussions on equity incentive problems, get a lot of research results, but on the quantitative incentive stock options Analysis of the literature small, and most confined to the deterministic model or stock prices of non-random process of the model of uncertainty. Based on the draw and absorb the existing domestic and international research and practice on the basis of the results of some important concepts into the definition of stock options and incentive mechanisms were analyzed; In the stock price under the conditions of the process for the process to establish incentive-based stock options were the principal-agent game, meet the minimum retained earnings effect of binding the two sides hope that the optimal effectiveness of the general model (E-V model); established a period of stock On the implementation of the right to a fixed specific E-V model (E-V-1 model), and discussion of the analytical model of a balanced strategy of establishing a random with the implementation of the agency, the Game random balanced strategy E-V model ( E-V-2 model). In this paper, the results of China's enterprises entrusted to the agents - the owner of the asset managers of the remuneration structure design theories and methods for reference.