| In the model of consensus-transfer pricing, the Group Headquarters'main role is coordination and communication of information, rather than taking direct orders. Thus, it can contribute to mobilize all members'management active, and make headquarters'transfer pricing policies be truly implemented. At the same time, it can make the headquarters be free from cumbersome administrative affairs and thus greatly reduce the management costs. Based on the existing theoretical and empirical studies, we introduce negative incentive mechanism at the process of negotiations of all internal member centers to design the internal transfer pricing, so that centers can get rational pricing game in the consultation mechanism.By analyzing the member center's consensus-transfer pricing between the two sides with the model, when the business groups can get Symmetric Information or Asymmetric Information, we have gotten the following conclusions: First, to intensify the punishment when the negotiations between the two sides on the transaction is efficiency (the optimal consensus-transfer pricing can't be gotten as soon as possible), we can avoid both short-term acts and conspiracy acts. Therefore, we can effectively avoid imperfect consensus-transfer pricing, and ultimately contribute to obtain the optimal internal transfer prices of consultations access; Second, in the circumstance of negative incentives , the consensus-transfer pricing is not only apply to the situation that intermediate products in external markets are not perfectly competitive and information is completely symmetrical, but also apply to the situation that the external markets are perfectly competitive and information is completely asymmetrical; Third, bounded by negative incentives, the rational managers of centers would be more conscientious to maximize the group's interests , thus effectively circumvent the optimization and achieve the purposes of optimizing consultation prices. |
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