| Since the corporate value in question in the Western countries, there has been rapid development and progress in theory and in practice. Relatively speaking, China is still in the primary stage of socialism and the market economy system has not yet perfect, the research on corporate value is not thorough enough. At present, there are many researches about the relationship between ownership structure and the corporate value, but these did not reach an unified conclusion. There conclusions can be roughly divided into three categories: Firstly, the concentration of shareholding has a positive impact on the corporate value; secondly, the concentration of shareholding has a negative impact on the corporate value; thirdly, there is no significant linear relationship between the concentration of shareholding and the corporate value.Shareholding structure is an important component of the corporate governance, it impact on the corporate value .Shareholding structure is reasonable or not directly related to whether the company can effectively improve the efficiency of corporate governance, finally enhance the company value. This paper summarized the conclusions of previous studies on the basis of the value of the company's relationship with the ownership structure was further exploration, the aim of China's listed companies through equity structure and value of the theoretical and empirical analysis, verification the correlation between Ownership Structure and Corporate Value Correlation.This paper has reviewed the value of the company at home and abroad as well as on the shareholding structure of the literature. In the theoretical stage ,briefly including Labor Theory of Value, utility theory of value, cost and value of the market value, on the company's corporate value and value characteristics of the measurement methods, and highlight introduce the method of calculation of Tobin's' Q. Final in the stage of the theoretical study this paper link the corporate value to the shareholding structure research the number of major shareholders of the value of the company, stock checks and balances of the company and external value of shareholder value nature of the impact on the company. In the demonstration part, this paper empirical researches the sample companies from 2003 to 2006, which in China's Shanghai Securities market and Shenzhen Securities market. This paper classified the sample companies to three different companies according to certain standards that is absolute holding companies, checks and balances-holding companies and decentralized holding firms, and then according to these three companies did descriptive statistics and independent samples T-test divisionally, the test results tell us Equity check and balances company value is higher than the other two and when the first major shareholder equity ratio (FSH) equivalent to 19.95%, the company's value can be maximized and when the equity equivalent of competition (TOP) 1.475, the company's value can be maximized conclusions. Finally, this article divided the samples into two groups according to the proportion of floating stock whether more than 40% or not, and regression analysis results show that the share reform after the full circulation of the securities market will be more interest to enhance corporate value.Combining results of the theory and empirical research,conclusion that:(1) The corporate the first major shareholders holding the appropriate concentration whose value is larger than the first major shareholding disproportionately large .Generally ,when the first major shareholders disproportionately large share holdings, the first major shareholder with a controlling stake and the real decision-making power, so the first major shareholders often sacrifice small shareholders' interest in order to maximize their benefits, then bring about a phenomenon that major shareholders occupy the interests of small shareholders and a "tunnel effect" .When the highly decentralized stake, a considerable number of shareholders holding several similar, individual shareholders' effect finitely. This can be avoided stake in the highly centralized under the polarization characteristics of the behavior of shareholders, while avoiding the individual shareholders and managers of collusion between the shareholders and the existence of a mechanism of checks and balances. But individual shareholders lack of supervision of the management company to operate the enthusiasm, as the shareholders control the company brings performance improvements and the upgrading of the company at a value everyone can enjoy the public goods, and control costs by monitoring it all himself, which is why decentralization Shareholders will be "free-rider" motive. So only the first major shareholders at the appropriate ratio can help enhance the value of the company.(2) If the nature of the largest and second-largest shareholder is identical, the company's value relatively high. Because the different nature of the main shareholders the different of their investment motivation, behavior and preferences. Generally speaking, a corporation is superior to state-owned holding company. When the nature of the first major shareholders and the second largest shareholder is identical also in line background, the two is easier to make the same decision, thereby reducing private income due to the information asymmetry between shareholders and enhance company value.(3) There is no absolute control of the shareholders ,that is, several major shareholders achieve mutual checks and balances, the company's value relatively high. La Porta (1999) thank that the interests of controlling shareholder and the interests of minority shareholders are different, there usually emerge a serious conflict between controlling shareholder and minority shareholders, the controlling shareholder may be at the expense of the interests of small and medium investors, to pursue their own interests' maximization. La Porta (1999) also believe that the existence of a number of major shareholders is inadequate legal protection alternatives. If one country's legal system, whose protection of the minority shareholders is inadequate, there will be decentralized control of the more common (Gomes and Novaes, 2005). In China, the protection of investors and the legal system is not yet perfect, stock appropriately and maintaining several large shareholders of mutual checks and balances, the ownership structure might prove to be more conducive to protecting the rights and interests of the vast number of investors and safeguard the interests of all shareholders. In the long run may help improve the efficiency of the company's management.(4) The stronger competition of the other major shareholders for control the higher the value of the company. This paper introduce TOP to measure the competitiveness of both equity element of the internal mechanisms, but also the composition of external mechanism, the second to the fifth largest shareholder can often be effectively curbed the largest shareholder of "tunneling", especially when the company of poor management, these shareholders for their own interests, they will use their stake to the company for the control of the second to the fifth largest shareholder equity more concentrated, the extent of this for the strong, thereby contributing to enhancing the value of the company.(5) When the company in the proportion of tradable shares equivalent is more than 40%, the shareholding structure of checks and balances on the value of the company is more significant impact will be felt. When the company in the proportion of tradable shares equivalent is more than 40% can reduce the probability that shareholder manipulation profits, but this does not means that there is no manipulation of profit, profit manipulation remains generally. |
PDF Full Text Request