The Research On Gencos' Bidding Strategy Based On Theory Of Game

Under electricity market, Power generators sale power in forward market and spot market.It is very important to find an efective and reasonable bidding model, which will not only motivate the generating enterprises to strengthen management and improve the efficiency, consequently decreasing the electricity price, but also bring the market risk and steady transition into consideration. While it is also necessary for regulators to investigate such strategicbidding behavior so as to identify possible market power abuse and to limit such abuse by introducing appropriate market regulation rules. This paper is established in the regulation of electricity market. The paper studies on the bidding game of Power Generation Company during the marketization proceeding, and explores the inherence motivation of using cooperative bidding or non-cooperative bidding strategy by Generation Company.Relevant parts of Game Theory, Microeconomics and Power Market Theory are used to analyze the gaming behaviors of the generating corporations when facing the two markets in the generation-oriented market. Power generators' forward contract sales have strategic impacts on the competition in power generation spot markets. It is possible that these strategic impacts also give rise to another incentive for generators to sign forward contracts. Strategic forward contracting induced by this incentive is examined under diferent competition types in a generation spot market with asymmetric and multiple strategic generators.