A Research Of Big Shareholder's Behavior Characteristics After Stockholder's Rights Mounted Cylinder Reform

In April, 2004, stockholder' rights mounted cylinder reform happened in China. So far, the reform has been finished for listed companies. This paper focuses on the relationship between stockholder's rights mounted cylinder reform and changes of large shareholders' behavior characteristics firstly. Then changes of large shareholders' behavior characteristics are listed. At last, impacts of these changes on listed companies' values are discussed. Since the corporate governance research has been deeper and deeper, more and more attention is paid on the role large shareholders play in listed company governance. Meanwhile, how to manage the "agent relationship" between large shareholders and minority stockholders becomes one of the top issues of company governance. Therefore, large shareholders' behavioral pattern this paper engaged in, means "tunneling" and "propping", of which, the research is based on the changing of the two kinds of behaviors after stockholder's rights mounted cylinder reform.In the first chapter, the introduction part, we discuss the topic background, the thread of argument and methods.The second chapter, which is the document summary section, we pay more attention on the theory of stockholder's rights mounted cylinder reform and large shareholders' behavior researches at home and abroad.The third chapter, firstly gives analysis on large shareholders' behavior characteristics after stockholder's rights mounted cylinder, including their "tunneling" and "propping". Then, we introduce the definitions of the two behaviors, relevant papers, cause and motive of large shareholders' "tunneling".The forth chapter mainly analyzes the behavior changes and the influence on companies' values. After that, we draw our conclusion that, stockholder's rights mounted cylinder reform will boost supervision level of large shareholders , reduce the possibility of their occupation of corporate assets directly or indirectly through "tunneling". Therefore, agency costs will be cut down and company values will be added.In the next part, we step in empirical analysis. The Statistical analysis result shows stockholder's rights mounted cylinder reform greatly promote company values. It proves that correlation between shareholding structure of listed company, earnings per share and price to earnings ratio is evident. The sixth chapter summaries this paper. The innovation of this paper is that we study the significance of stockholder's rights mounted cylinder reform from behavior patterns of large shareholders and its impacts on listed companies' values.