An Study On Asymmetric Informaition,Credit Support And The Risk Of Real Estate Bubble

In the time of economical normal development,The real estate market should maintain certain banlanced relations with the macroeconomy.The real estate price cannot deviate from the long-term banlanced value unsteadily.But in the prosperity time of the real estate economy, the market prosperity arouses every participatant enormous enthusiasm because of some system flaws such as asymmetrical information,weak restraint. Banks would excessively support the real estate industry for the house price's rise that makes the market produce the expectation that the price has a further rise, while causes to appear lots of serious communal speculative investment behaviors in the society, causes the real estate price to deviate form the market's foundation price,forms the positive feedback process of self-realization,urges the risk of the real estate to accumulate continuously, necessarily influences the national economy's healthy development in the end.This article's research content is arranged as follows:In the first part the paper introduces introduction and basical theories.Firstly,the text introduces the background,purpose and significance about why to choose this topic,and looks back the related theory literatures.Next,the text simply explains the way of thinking,method and some possible innovations are pointed out in this text. Finally,Several important concepts related to this text:adverse selection,moral hazard,principal- agent theory,real estate bubble,etc are intruduced in order to lay the theory's foundation for the followed text.In the second part the paper introduces the behavior analysis of banks,developers,residents and bank manager based on asymmetrical information.With the research technique of evolution gambling,the text analyzes the balanced solution that banks,developers and residents achieves after their mutual affects under the condition of information incompletion,limited reasonality and microscopic main body limitation. Specially,from entrust-agent theory ,this text analyzes that the bank managers produce a positive feedback effect between the credit market and the real estate market as a result of the cost-income dissymmetry under the present bank's system background of China. A conclusion is obtained that the parties'interacction promotes accumulating development of the risk of the real estate bubble.In the third part the paper introduces the statistical analysis of the positive feedback effect between the risk of the real estate bubble and credit support and the whole evalution in Chi na. Firstly,Mainly using cointegration,ECM model,this paper empirically analyzes the conclunsions from the preceding paragraphs.The result shows that there is a positive feedback effect indeed between the risk of the real estate bubble and credit support in the recently several years in China.Secondly,Through the direct index method mainly,this chapter makes a empirical analysis to the Chinese real estate in the recent years.The conslution is that China's real estate bubble occures from the critical value still at a distance.But it also shows that at present China's real estate bubble tendency is clear ,if not strengthen macro-control, easily leaded to the ultimate outbreak.At last,some operational policy suggestions are proposed about how to overcome the information asymmetry and how to guard against the risk of the current real estate price in China.