Game-Theoretic Analysis Of The Accounting Policy Choice Of Listed Companies

Different accounting policy choices would generate different accounting information, which would affect the benefit of the stakeholders of the listed company. The motivations which the stakeholders look forward to by choosing accounting policy are different. So the result of accounting policy choice depends on the result of game between the stakeholders.After analyzing the target of the accounting policy choice of listed companies and the present situation of the accounting policy choice of listed companies in our country, with the stakeholder theory and the game theory the thesis builds the game model between the government and the listed company, between the shareholder and the listed company, between the creditor and the listed company and between the employee and the listed company respectively. The government supplies the accounting policy and supervises the listed company's accounting behaviors. So the game between the government and the listed company includes the game between the supplier of accounting policy and the game between the supervisor and the listed company. In modern enterprise system, because of the division between the power of operation and the proprietary right and the operator owns the surplus controlling power , the game between the shareholder and the listed company is the game between the shareholder and the operator. Because state-owned institutional shares of our country hold absolute controlling interest and the government capital structure is not perfect, the operator is the consignor of auditing listed company. The game among the shareholder and the operator and the certified public accountant turns into the game between the operator and the certified public accountant. The debt contract and the operator's motivation shifting the wealth from the creditor to the shareholder make the game between the creditor and the listed company. For more reward the employee prefers to radical accounting policy. But the owner likes conservative accounting policy more. The employee could choose different attitudes on working. So there is a game between the employee and the listed company. At last, according to the result of game-theoretic analysis the thesis gives some advices on perfecting the behavior of choosing accounting policy of listed companies.The result of the research indicates that the asymmetrical information causes the stakeholders' different positions on accounting policy choice of listed companies. The result of accounting policy choice depends on the result of game between the stakeholders. And the stakeholder who wins the game would get more benefit.