Experimental And Modeling Study On Principal-agent Relationship Basing On Trust Game

The traditional economic theory was based on the prospective utility maximum which proposed by Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944, it considers that the economic behavior is up to the extrinsic motivation. The Principal-agent Problem also is under this framework, because of the information asymmetry led by the capital market information uncalculated, the rational of both the principal and the agent will result in the value maximize goal in the corporate governance structure failure. The traditional principal-agent theory considers that the principal and the agent must make the full-inspiriting contract related with the agent's interest, otherwise, the agent cost increases. However, the incompletely contract is the general rule in the real economic life, so that the full-inspiriting contract is inexistence.A great deal of experimental evidences in experimental economics suggests that many people are strongly motivated by other-regarding preferences, the preferences of fairness, reciprocity, punishment, trust are also impact the people's decision. Based on these research achievements, this paper modifies the self-interest hypothesis in the principal-agent relationship, and reviews the strategy interaction between the principal and the agent by the behavioral game theory. This paper designs three game experiments according to the principal-agent relationship in the real corporation government, and researches whether the trust reciprocity exists or not between the shareholder and the manager and the relationship between the strategy and the payoff under the incompletely contract. This paper establishes a multi-stage trust game model through introducing a random perturbed variable, and then tests it by the experimental data.This paper finds that the result under the moral hazard game isn't the worst result predicted by the traditional game theory. In the experiment, the principal and the agent both trust their opponent, and are willing to take on the risk, and the players are would like to return the opponent's trust. This paper finds that the real payoff can strongly impact the degree of the trust, the player can sacrifice to trust their opponent in a extension, but if the payoff is larger than this extension, that is to say their trust will be feebleness while the cost is large, the players become the traditional self-interest. The game length between the principal and the agent also affects the trust degree, the more persistent the cooperation relationship continues, the stronger interpretative capability of the trust is. In addition, if the game length increases, the players will pay more attention to the difference of the own payoff.Researching the trust reciprocity in the principal-agent relationship, can extant the category of the principal-agent problem, and proposer new feasible project for the encouragement mechanism design, and give assistant to the corporation government structure study. This paper adopts the behavioral game theory concept, so that give a new perspective to the game theory development and practically application.