Research On Third Party Logistics Moral Hazard Under Asymmetric Information

Third party logistics,as a new form of logistics,has tremendous advantages compared to the logistics self-conducted.Many enterprises have the desire to use a third-party logistics in china, but China's actual use of third party logistics is very low due to the existence of moral hazard. How can we control the risk of moral hazard is the goal third-party logistics research scholars pursued.Through analyzing of the development of third-party logistics,we know third party logistics' moral hazard is important reason for the slow pace of third-party logistics development. And based on the analysis of third party logistics moral hazard causes and characteristics,we know governing the risk of moral hazard need internal and external dual governance mechanisms. In the internal governance,firstly,using of game theory point of view,through establishing four-stage model incentive game analysis and monitoring analysis,illustrate inherent operating mechanism that incentives and supervision govern third party logistics moral hazard;then based on game analysis,using information economics " principal -agent model",and through strict mathematical definition for the degree of effort supervision difficulty,analyze logistics entrusting enterprises use incentives and supervision to govern third party logistics moral hazard effectively,that is using incentive mechanisms in the condition the effort is difficult to observe, using supervisory mechanisms in the condition the effort is easy to observe.In the external governance,through establishing framework and analyzing government and logistics association's deficiency in the environment governing and strengthening cost of moral hazard, analyze external governance effect in the moral hazard management.Finally,according to the internal governance and external governance mechanism analysis put forward the corresponding concrete measures.