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Research On Moral Hazard Avoiding Of The Third Party Logistics

Posted on:2008-10-22Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y B HuangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189360242464816Subject:Political economy
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The third-party logistics (TPL) is one of important transforms in the world economy field when 21century is coming, and one of important trends of our national economy in the new century. It is very significant to promote the national economy to develop, and improve the quality of whole economy. Though logistics industry in China has been from the stage of start into the stage of development, it is still slowly going ahead. It is one of the most important reasons that there is Moral hazard which exit in cooperation between the consignor enterprise and the third party logistics Based on the factors of the moral hazard in the third-party logistics and its classification,this paper analysis the causes and solutions of different types of moral hazard in-depth. When the consignor enterprise and logistics enterprises signed leases, special investment is the first thing to consider. First, through analysis of"Hold-up"problem in model,"Hold-up"which special investment and opportunism led to has resulted in inadequate investment, this paper raised vertical integration, strategic alliances and other measures. Second, on the general moral hazard problem, this paper constructs the game model from perspective of complete contract and incomplete contract. Through game analysis we can conclude: The consignor should gradually increase inputs of fixed costs of supervision. And through empirical analysis that the two sides establish a long-term cooperative relations and the establishment of an open-exchange feasible mechanism are measures which achieve a win-win goal. Finally, on incentive distortion issues of omission or other tasks damage in which Logistics enterprises result by pursuiting a single task, through modeling and empirical analysis, we can conclude: The alternative of increasing logistics cost savings and improving service quality is mutual, but improving the quality of service is unmeasurable. Under such circumstances, we should weaken the incentives of cost savings, improve evaluation system of logistics service quality and enhance incentive mechanisms.
Keywords/Search Tags:Third-party logistics, Moral hazard, Principal-agent, Game analysis
PDF Full Text Request
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