The Analysis Of The Retailer Market Power From The View Of Welfare

In the last 20 years, as the constant emergence of new retail trade and the popularity of the large-scale chain management, global retail industry has undergone tremendous changes.Particularly,there have been some retail giants which both control the domestic market and actively expand to the overseas.With the continued expansion,their market power bring about underestimated impact to the economic.On the one hand,as the decision force the market power affect the profits of manufacturers.On the other hand,market power have the pricing power of commodity prices,thus directly affect consumer welfare.So in modern society retailers market power can not be ignored.How does the retailer impact the manufacturers,retailers counterparts and its consumers by continuesly strengthen market power and the charging the slotting allowance?What regulation measures the government departments whose objective is to maximize social welfare would take to the market power?Both in theory and in practice,it is a question worthy of study.The paper is divided into six chapters:The introduction part point out the background,the significance of past research,the way of the research and bring out the new idea of the thesis.Chapter one is the theory basis of this paper,including the formation factors of the retail market power and the expert of the welfare effects.It points out that the angle of welfare is suitable.From the perspective of the market structure,chapter one explains the theoretical model.From the perspective of the market structure,chapter two explains the theoretical model of this paper.The retailer welfare effect is different under the different three market structure,that is the buyer monopoly power with retailers but the seller does not,both have the buyer and seller power,and bilateral monopoly.Analysis showed that:the case that the retailer both have the buyer and seller power,its welfare losses bigger than the case that only have the seller;the case that the retailer under the bilateral monopoly,its welfare losses is smaller than both have the buyer and seller power. Chapter three is the benefit analysis of retailer market power to the stakeholders, including the effect to upstream suppliers and downstream consumers and small and medium-sized retailers.Analysis showed that:when the retailer with the buyer monopoly power only,charging slotting allowance will increase the profits of retailers and reduce the consumer surplus,the impact to the social welfare depends on the nature of demand function;when retailers both have the buyer and seller power, charging slotting allowance have no impact to the social welfare;when retailers with the bilateral monopoly,charging slotting allowance will increase the joint profits of the manufacturers,retailers and fall the retail prices and increase the consumer surplus and social welfare.Chapter four exams the welfare losses of the retailer market power.It used minimum and maximum limit estimation model and select 10 representative enterprises of the retail industry to inspected the market forces of the benefit costs.Analysis showed that:Chinese retail industry is full of market forces,the net welfare loss of output is as high as 15 percent,and retailers continued to strengthen market forces.The last part is the conclusion of this paper, which mainly overviews the important arguments in the paper and refers to the problems that need further study.