Mechanism Design Of Insurance Agent And Game Analysis On Medical Insurance Fraud

As there are asymmetric information and principal-agent relationship between the insurance company and insurance agent in ordinary insurance, there exists moral hazard and adverse selection problems. While in medical insurance, insurance company entrusts medical institution with patients'examination. As the insurance company has no direct economic relation with medical institution, there exists medical insurance fraud problem.This paper studies the moral hazard and adverse selection problems of insurance agent, and applies the studies on the insurance fraud problem in medical insurance and some valuable results are obtained.Simple principal-agent model is easy to use but lacks the multi-effort consideration, while the multi-task principal-agent model is in the opposite situation. This paper firstly studies the incentive mechanism between the insurance company and insurance agent in asymmetric information by a multi-effort principal-agent model. The effort that insurance agent dedicates to the task is divided into three parts for further consideration and the incentive mechanism on the state of the world of a random variable following Poisson distribution and normal distribution is separately discussed. As a result, this paper obtains optimal linear contracts and the correlation between contracts and coefficients in both situations. In the end, some relative suggestions on incentive mechanism are prompted. The adverse selection model and moral hazard model with agent having personalinformation ex post have been discussed in general principal-agent sense, and theoretical analysis is emphasized. In view of the two situations in which the insurance agent has private information about his own type ex ante and observes information in insurance market ex post, the paper analyses the optimal contract using a adverse selection model and a moral hazard model with agent having personal information ex post and some suggestions on incentive mechanism are obtained. The paper applies the studies on the insurance fraud problem in medical insurance and some relative suggestions on mechanism are provided for reference.In the last chapter, the results of this paper are summarized and the further work is presented.