Based On The Auto Insurance Adverse Selection And Moral Hazard Principal-agent Theory

In automobile insurance services, there have produced adverse selection and the moral hazard problem because of information's asymmetric between the assurer and the applicant, functional regularity having disturbed insurance gravely brings into play, effective allocation having hindered insurance marketplace resource. For this purpose, we have important significance for adverse selection and moral hazard problem in automobile insurance studies.Under here background, the main body of this book takes automobile insurance as marriage partner, agency by agreement theory-based analytical train of thought, making use of game to study automobile insurance is hit by applicant's moral hazard and chooses a problem backward in terms of method. The main bodies of this book have done the following aspect jobs mainly:First, giving the review of moral hazard and adverse selection in automobile insurance services.Second, under the patient degree thinking to safe both sides's situation, building the higgling game between the assurer and the applicant , trying to find the optimum guarantor rate that the assurer provides to the applicant during the period of backward alternative, problem resolving applicant's adverse selection thereby.Third, considering the moral hazard losing probability moral hazard and being in danger now that effect is in danger at the same time, the auther has obeyed the logarithm normal distribution owing to claimant forehead, having built a signal transferring the game model, and studied even insurance both sides game. Reach conclusion in three aspects: (1) The probability being an assurer's examine and verify cost increasingly highly , moral hazard there exists in applicant is right away increasingly big. (2) Applicants the moral hazard probability appear on block of wood and the punishment direct proportion time moral hazard appears, be that the moral hazard probability is right away increasingly big think that the punishment to the applicant is increasingly big. (3) When the parameters except parameter f keep invariant moment, we can overtop value with fine within the probability danger moral hazard appearing on applicant being in under the control.