A Study Of The Capital Allocation Behavior And It's Ocuppy Effect Under The Large Shareholder's Control In Listed Companies

In recent 20 years, with lucubrating on corporate governance worldwide and springing up of corporate finance theory, it not only remodeled and developed the theoretic hypothesis of traditional corporate financing, but also shown up a new viewpoint of research on mechanism of the acts of corporate investment, in frame of the combination of governance mechanism and behavior character of financial decision-making body. Later there are many scholars have studied this theme from different aspect. Recent years there are a number of puzzling phenomena for investment behavior of china listed companies, such as frequently changing investment project and low investment efficiency. And many scholars have studied it from different point, but there is little literature has studied it from the aspect of capital allocation.this paper uses the newly research achievements of corporate governance theory and corporate financing theory for reference adequately, based on share arrangement system and statue quo of domination structure which are unique by listed companies in China, and make behavior character of large shareholder and his agent as the cut-in point, according to related theory of Investment and financing. Based on the combination of corporate governance theory and behavioral corporate financing theory, this project probes the investment behavior and its efficiency of listed companies deeply and systematically.Based on the theory of the control benefit driving capital allocation and the control arrangement under the special equity structure in Chinese listed company, this paper empirically studies the capital allocation resulting in control benefit firstly from fixed asset investment, equity merge and research & development investment. The conclusions are:(1)The level of private benefits of control is positively related to fixed assets investment scale; (2) The level of private benefits of control is positively related to equity merger investment scale; (3) The level of private benefits of control is negatively related to research & development investment scale;This paper set a multiple regression model, in which fixed assets investment scale, equity merger investment scale and research & development investment scale were the dependent variable and the net return of equity was explaining variable. The regressive result were: (1)The fixed assets investment and the non-connection equity merger investment accounts for the proportion of capital collocation to be very big, but research & development investment occupies is very smaller than; (2) The fixed assets investment and the non-connection equity merger investment were not significantly relative to the net assets returns ratio ;but the research & development investment had a significantly positive relate to the net assets returns ratio;(3) combined with the regression result of the level of private benefits of control and the scale of capital allocations, under the control of control shareholders , it does not increase public control benefit by improving corporate performance, so decision - making for capital allocation is more likely to be the self-beneficial behaviors of the control shareholder .they increased the fixed assets investment and non-connection equity merger investment scale in order to get more private benefits of control. As a result, it occupied the ratio of research & development investment. It's had a bad influence on the corporate's development and had a harm of the benefits of the smaller shareholders.