A Study On The Influence Of The Marketization Process And Corporate Governance On Private Benefits Of Control

The traditional corporate governance theory is based on dispersed ownership. With the concentrating structure widely existing in the world, the study focus of corporate governance is transferring from the agent problem of traditional "shareholder--manager" to the agent problem between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Many studies show that controlling shareholders encroach the interest of minority shareholders is a very common phenomenon in the worldwide. Controlling shareholders' pursuit of PBC damage the interest of minority shareholders and the function of capital market allocation of resources. It makes the majority of external investors lost confidence in China's securities market and hinder the healthy development of financial markets. It's a worldwide problem that how to protect the interest of minority shareholders and restrict controlling shareholders'encroachment behavior. Therefore,the problem of private benefits of control has been the core of the study of corporate governance.In the thesis, we firstly analyzed the theoretical base of its' existing and measured the scale of Chinese listed companies'PBC. Based on it, we primarily discussed the effect mechanism and degree of the major influential factors considering the process of marketization and internal governance mechanism. It will provide theoretical bracing and policy advice to perfect and standardize the corporate governance of Chinese listed companies. The thesis firstly define the concepts which has relations with PBC and conceive the theoretical frame of PBC. This part provide the theoretical foundation for the following study. The premise to study PBC is how to exactly measure the scale of Chinese listed companies'PBC. So the thesis firstly generalize four measuring PBC method which are popularly used all over the world and point out their defects. Based on the conditions of our country, we select t the block trade premiums method. In the thesis, we choose 169 samples which took place from 2001 to 2008 and draw the conclusion that the scale of our country's PBC is 13.37%.This result reflect the degree that controlling shareholders encroached minority shareholders'rights and interests.The factor which affect the scale of PBC is the focal point of this thesis. And we will study two kinds of factors that includes the influence of the marketization process and includes the influence of the corporate governance characteristics. In the study of the marketization process, we found that the law of our country could not protect minority shareholders validly.It is the reason that the relevant law didn't be well executed by government.The development level of non-state economy will promote the controlling shareholders to get PBC in a measure and the degree of government intervention have no effect on PBC.T he seperation of ultimate ownership ultimate controlling rights exacerbate the motivation of acquiring PBC.The agency investor and the independent board director didn't excert their function to supervise controlling shareholders. The controlling shareholders possess so many stock that the others who have big proportiong stock couldn't prevent their encroachment behavior. The different ultimate controlling shareholders have different effects on the acquiring of PBC. If the ultimate controlling shareholders is a natural people,it will get more PBC than the others.If it is a government section, It will get fewer PBC than the others.The thesis is a study of PBC from the perspective of the process of market factors and corporate governance factors.Based on what we talk above, we put forward the policy proposals of solving PBC problem by strengthen the financial securities' supervising, perfect the institution of the independent board director.