Research On The Relationship Between Ultimate Control Rights In Listed Companies And Corporation Performance

Research of corporate governance based on control rights has always been the focus for researchers. And with the development to the depth, more attention has been paid to ultimate control rights. The central problem that a lot of nonstandard behaviors of security market of our country is ultimate control rights. The ultimate controllers control the corporation by pyramids-shareholdings or cross-shareholdings and the characteristic is a deviation between the control rights and the cash flow rights. It may lead to the result that proprietary shareholders exploit the medium and small investors heavily.This article regards listed company from 2005 to 2006 as the research object, combines with criterion study and empirical research method in order to analysis on the relationship between ultimate control rights and corporate performance and puts forward some countermeasures. There are five chapters in the article and the main content is as follow:Chapter one puts forward the incentive and meanings of the research and reviews the related literatures. These literatures research ultimate control right at a different angle and open up a new way for the article.Chapter two firstly describes the theoretical basis of ultimate control rights, including contract theory and principal-agent theory. Then define the concept of ultimate control rights.Chapter three analyses on the relevant elements of ultimate control right and corporate performance, define and discuss the properties of ultimate control rights and the deviation between the control rights and the cash flow rights specifically.Chapter four is the empirical study. In this part the relationship between ultimate control rights and corporate performance was revealed by descriptive statistical analysis and multiple regression analysis.Chapter five gives conclusions. Some countermeasures are put forward.The main conclusions of this article are as follows: the proportion of the state holding listed company is higher than the privately holding listed company. Ownership concentration degree is high and the deviation between the control rights and the cash flow rights is remarkable. The corporation performance of the state holding listed company is better than that of the privately holding listed company. There is a positive correlation between the proportion of cash flow rights and corporation performance. A negative correlation is existed between the deviation between the control rights and the cash flow rights and corporation performance. Ultimate control rights shows no significant correlation with the combination of general manager and chairman of the board.